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+# RFC: Disallow use of downloading of external Python code that bypasses Registry auditing
+
+- Start Date: 2025-01-14
+- Target Major Version: N/A (Policy baseline)
+- Reference Issues: https://github.com/Comfy-Org/docs/pull/50, https://github.com/1038lab/ComfyUI-OmniGen/issues/38
+- Implementation PR: (leave this empty)
+
+## Summary
+
+Update Security Baseline Policy (for Registry, etc.) to include a restriction on 
+using `requests` or other download mechanisms to bypass code auditing of code needed 
+for custom modules.
+
+## Motivation
+
+As part of Security policy, we disallow and prohibit certain behaviors that may be 
+added to custom modules uploaded ot the Registry. Certain behaviors such as using 
+`subprocess` calls to do `pip install` or other commands to obtain libraries, etc. 
+for use in a module are already prohibited.
+
+However, it was discoverered in referenced issues on ComfyUI-OmniGen that the module 
+relies on `requests` and a list of filenames and URL base paths to download and then 
+later within the module import the separately downloaded OmniGen code-base.
+
+Similar to the Ultralytics issue in December of 2024, this type of behavior introduces 
+insecure behavior and can result in malicious code being downloaded and executed that 
+is outside the scope of Registry security and peer auditing. While the Ultralytics problem 
+was a result of hijacked GitHub secrets and publishing secrets, the same premise of hijacked 
+third party code / download links still applies here. It is why we do not allow random 
+`subprocess` calls to `pip install ...` commands outside of the module requirements lists, 
+and similar reasoning should be applied to the use of `requests` or other direct downloading 
+of files independently outside of the Registry audit process and security processing tooling 
+or the requirements resolution tooling built into ComfyUI-Manager.
+
+## Adoption strategy
+
+If implemented, modules in the ComfyUI registry which are doing this behavior will be rejected 
+on review, and modules currently in the ComfyUI registry found to be doing this behavior 
+will need security issues raised against their repositories. Module developers will need to 
+either adjust their requirements or similar to package the externally-obtained libraries in 
+their codebase or otherwise have suitable ways to ship the code (via `git submodule` or 
+direct codebase inclusion of such libraries / dependencies) or risk removal of the module from 
+the Registry.
+
+## Unresolved questions
+
+We do not currently have any clear way of detecting these activities in the code currently 
+in code auditing tooling, however we could develop YARA rules or other analysis rules 
+which would be able to detect the potential misuse of `requests` library calls, as seen 
+in the ComfyUI-OmniGen modules, in future module uploads.