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Description
When parsing through the json output, certain properties are captured that cannot be queried via BloodHound or the neo4j consoles.
For example:
{
"kind": "AZAppRoleAssignment",
"data": {
"appRoleId": "01c0a623-fc9b-48e9-b794-0756f8e8f067",
"createdDateTime": "2022-08-12T14:11:25.0841466Z",
"id": "1cBV4_REDACTED",
"principalDisplayName": "Postman",
"principalId": "e355c0d5-REDACTED-f91bb0c16323",
"principalType": "ServicePrincipal",
"resourceDisplayName": "Microsoft Graph",
"resourceId": "129f86f8-REDACTED-554be743f9b9",
"appId": "00000003-0000-0000-c000-000000000000",
"tenantId": "REDACTED"
}
}This node/relationship is captured, so AzureHound is able to identify nodes with the Policy.ReadWrite.ConditionalAccess permission
However, this query fails to return any results when it has clearly been captured by the utility.
MATCH (n:AZServicePrincipal)
WHERE n.approleid = "01c0a623-fc9b-48e9-b794-0756f8e8f067" OR n.approleid = "ad902697-1014-4ef5-81ef-2b4301988e8c"
RETURN n
It would immensely beneficial to be able to return nodes that have these properties, even if they do not currently map attack paths (CA Policies are not captured via AzureHound) to other nodes as this would allow users to identify potential targets to investigate.
lampnout
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